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ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Priority No. 15 
v. : 
JOHN PETER KIRILUK, : Case No. 970200-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Should this Court delete dicta in its opinion suggesting that a noncoercive Miranda 
violation must be treated as a constitutional violation for purposes of prejudicial error 
analysis? 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
This petition does not seek to alter the reasoning or result in this case. Rather, it 
asks the Court to delete dicta in the fourth sentence in the second full paragraph on page 5 
of the Court's opinion, and insert the following: 
A Miranda violation is not necessarily a constitutional violation. State v. 
Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah). However, even if the instant violation 
rose to the level of a constitutional violation, it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
See State v. Kiriluk, No. 971200-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah Ct. App. December 10, 1998) 
(addendum). 
The State recognizes that this petition for rehearing is not timely under Rule 35(a), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requiring the petition to be filed "within 14 days after 
the entry of the decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order." 
The Court's opinion in Kiriluk, was issued on 10 December 1998. However, Rule 2, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, allows the Court for "extraordinary cause" to 
"suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case" and 
"order proceedings . . . in accordance with its direction." The State therefore further 
requests that the Court invoke rule 2 here to suspend the requirements of Rule 35(a) and 
grant the instant petition upon the "extraordinary cause" demonstrated below.1 
lThe State is also filing motion to stay the remittitur and to extend the time for 
filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court in the event this Court 
declines to grant the petition for rehearing. The State is not simultaneously seeking 
remedies in both courts, but is only concerned to preserve the right to certiorari review 
should the Court decline the instant petition. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
DICTA SUGGESTING THE NONCOERCIVE MIRANDA 
VIOLATION EQUATED WITH A CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATION SHOULD BE DELETED BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY 
TO STATE V. TROYER, 910 P.2D 1182 (Utah 1995) 
This case involved the standard to be applied in reviewing a noncoercive Miranda 
violation. Ultimately, the Court declined to determine whether defendant's Miranda 
rights were violated, affirming the jury verdict on the ground that any Miranda violation 
was not prejudicial. See Kiriluk, slip op. at 5. In so doing, this Court set forth the 
standard for reviewing constitutional error recognized in State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628-29, 
113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993)) (requiring State to establish error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt). See Kiriluk, slip op. at 5. 
The Court's reliance in dicta on the Morrison/Brecht constitutional error standard 
is problematic because the Utah Supreme Court has held that a noncoercive Miranda 
violation such as occurred here does not equate with a constitutional violation. State v. 
Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1995). Generally, non-constitutional errors are 
reversible unless harmless; while constitutional errors are reversible unless harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. While Morrison and Brecht do involve M/randa-related 
issues, unlike the present case, Morrison and Brecht deal with the improper use at trial of 
a defendant's post-Miranda silence, a violation of due process, or constitutional error. 
3 
Morrison, 937 P.2d atl296; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629. Brecht recognizes that the rule of 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), that the prosecution may not introduce evidence 
of a defendant's post-Miranda silence, is not a mere "prophylactic rule" like Miranda, but 
rather, "fits squarely into the category of constitutional violations . . . characterized as 
'trial error.'" Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 409 U.S. 279, 307 
(1991)). Thus, Kiriluk's dicta suggesting that a noncoercive Miranda violation by itself 
must be treated as a constitutional violation for purposes of prejudicial error analysis is 
incorrect.2 
Accordingly, the State requests the Court to delete dicta suggesting that a 
noncoercive Miranda violation equates with a constitutional violation for purposes of 
prejudicial error analysis. Specifically, the State proposes that the second full paragraph 
on pages five and six of the opinion be amended as follows: 
Defendant contends that even under Mosley, his Miranda rights were 
violated. The issue is whether, after his invocation, the continued questioning in the first 
interview and the discussion of the same crime in the second interview makes Mosley 
inapplicable because defendant's Miranda rights were not "scrupulously honored" in the 
first interview. This is a question we need not answer because we conclude that, even if 
defendant's Miranda rights were violated, this violation was not prejudicial. 
We recognize that a Miranda violation is not necessarily a constitutional 
violation. State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah). However, even if 
the instant violation rose to the level of a constitutional violation, it was 
harmless bevond a reasonable doubt. State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 
1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 
2The Court's error may have been driven by the State's imprecise citation to 
Morrison as the applicable standard in the Brief of Appellee at p. 27. 
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628-29, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717(1993)). "In evaluating whether an 
evidentiary error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we focus on 
'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of 
might have contributed to the conviction.9" Id. at 1296 (citation omitted). 
"This higher standard does not require reversal solely because we might 
imagine a single juror whose decision hinged on [defendant's] confession. 
Rather, 'we look to what seems to us to have been the probable impact of 
the confession on the minds of the average juror.'" State v. Villarreal, 889 
P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995) (quoting Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 
254, 89 S.Ct 1726, 1728 (1969)). 
A number of factors determine whether an error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, including "the importance of the 
witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the 
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of 
evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the 
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination 
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the 
prosecution's case." 
Id. at 4251-26 (citations omitted). 
Kiriluk, slip op. at 5-6 (insertions added). This change will not affect the reasoning or 
result in this case, but will prevent the opinion from conflicting with Troyer. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should delete dicta suggesting that a noncoercive Miranda violation 
equates with a constitutional violation for purposes of review for prejudicial error 
analysis. 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J(Q_ January 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
IAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were 
mailed by first-class mail this vO January 1999 to: 
LINDA M. JONES 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
John Peter Kiriluk, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
AG 
FILED 
DEC 1 01998 
COURT OF APPEALS 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No- 971200-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 10, 1998) 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Linda M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Jackson. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant John Kiriluk appeals his conviction of criminal 
homicide, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 76-5-203 (Supp. 1997). We affirm. 
FACTS 
"In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the verdict. We recite the facts accordingly." State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). 
However, we are mindful that we must determine if the evidence 
relied upon by the jury "is so compelling that we can conclude, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the 
same verdict." State v. Dahlguist. 931 P.2d 862, 867 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997); £££ State V. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Utah 
1989) (A "reviewing court is to decide whether, considering all 
the evidence, there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would have decided the case differently.") (citation omitted)). 
Defendant and the victim were involved in the formulation 
and sale of methamphetamine. The victim served a variety of 
functions for defendant, including that of courier between 
defendant and others involved in the drug trade. In his last 
assignment, defendant gave the victim a large quantity of 
precursor to deliver to a methamphetamine "cook,"1 and told him 
to return the finished product. The finished methamphetamine was 
never returned and the victim was unable to produce the missing 
precursor. Defendant was upset with the victim for losing the 
precursor and concerned for his own well-being because defendant 
owed money to his suppliers. Defendant confronted the victim 
about the missing precursor, struck the victim in the face, and 
threatened the victim's life. Following this assault, defendant, 
the victim, and a number of other eventual codefendants left 
defendant's house in a car, ostensibly to search for the missing 
precursor. Defendant and the vehicle's occupants ended up in a 
remote area of Bluffdale, Utah. Defendant, the victim, and a 
third male occupant, Damon Mumford, who had met the victim only 
that day, exited the vehicle. Defendant took a knife from one of 
the female passengers, and the three men walked a short distance 
away. Approximately thirty minutes later, only defendant and 
Damon returned to the vehicle with a bloody knife and some of the 
victim's possessions. Defendant, Damon, and the others returned 
to defendant's apartment where defendant partially burned the 
victim's possessions, and directed two of the women to finish the 
job. 
The victim's body was found on March 22, 1998. Because 
defendant was one of the last people seen with the victim, police 
visited his apartment on the night of March 25, 1998. Upon 
arrival, the police saw drug paraphernalia in plain view. While 
some officers remained at the apartment, defendant agreed to 
accompany other officers to the police station for questioning. 
At the police station, officers interviewed defendant two 
separate times, and provided him with Miranda warnings at the 
outset of both interviews. In the first interview, the officers 
initially focused their questioning on the homicide. However, 
after receiving a phone call about drugs found in defendant's 
apartment, the focus changed and the police began to discuss the 
drugs. At this point, defendant unequivocally invoked his right 
to remain silent, but the police continued to briefly question 
him about the drugs. Around the same time, and after invoking 
his Miranda rights, defendant consented to a search of his 
apartment. Thereafter, the first interview ended. 
1. "Precursor" can be one of several ingredients necessary for 
the production of methamphetamine. 
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Two hours later, officers again questioned defendant. In 
the second interview, the officers questioned defendant only 
about the homicide. Defendant did not invoke his right to remain 
silent in this interview and openly discussed his version of the 
incidents leading up to the homicide. Initially, defendant told 
the officers that the victim was taken away by some "Mexicans" 
and killed. Defendant later switched stories and claimed that 
Damon led the victim away and returned alone, stating: "It's 
done." Defendant was later charged with and convicted of 
criminal homicide and now appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Violation of Defendant's Miranda Rights 
Defendant first argues that the police violated his Miranda 
rights when, after invoking his right to remain silent, he was 
questioned a second time the same night. We review this alleged 
constitutional violation under a correction of error standard. 
£££ State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
As a threshold matter, we disagree with defendant's 
contention that he invoked his right to counsel. Defendant 
initially waived his Miranda rights at the outset of the first 
interview. He asserts, however, that when the interview topic 
switched to drugs, he invoked his right to counsel and thus the 
officer was obligated to cease his questioning. Our supreme 
court has clearly articulated the standard for a postwaiver 
invocation of counsel: 
[0]nce a suspect has clearly, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived his Miranda rights, 
[Davis v, United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 s. 
Ct. 2350 (1994)], places the requirement of 
clarity with respect to postwaiver invocation 
of those rights on the suspect. As the 
majority in Davis describes it, the suspect 
"must articulate his desire to have counsel 
present sufficiently clearly that a 
reasonable police officer in the 
circumstances would understand the statement 
to be a request for an attorney." 
State v. Leyva. 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997) (quoting Davisf 512 
U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct. at 2355). Here, in the context of the 
colloquy between defendant and the interviewing officer, 
defendant fails the Davis test. 
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Q. Okay, Uh, back at the apartment there 
has been some narcotics found and some drugs 
found, okay? Also at the apartment, while 
they were there, people came up and were 
startin to make buys, right, right then and 
there while, while uh, my Sergeant and some 
other, uh, cops were there. Okay? Now this 
happened inside your apartment- You're going 
to be arrested for that, okay? Now, do, do 
you want any, make any statements in regard 
to that- Keep, keeping in mind everything 
about you do have the right to remain silent. 
You do have the right to have to have an 
attorney, things of that nature. (Det. Carr) 
A: Are you arresting me? (Inaudible) (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q: I'm not going to bullshit ya here. 
That's what the call was about, okay? The 
Sergeant said while they were there they've 
arrested four people there. Four people that 
have come up there, tried to make buys, 
someone came up with a bottle of pills, 
things of that nature, okay? But apparently 
there was some dope found actually at your 
apartment. Okay? Now that in and of itself 
is enough for possession. Bare minimal 
possession. There's not sayin that you're 
dealin, okay? But that's bare minimal 
possession. Okay? And that's, and that's 
what you'd be lookin at right now, so again. 
do you want to make any statements in that 
regard to anything that goesr went on in your 
apartment that has to do with the drugs that 
were found there? (Det. Carr) 
A: I don't. (John Kiriluk) 
(Emphasis added.) Defendant's argument that he invoked his right 
to counsel hinges on his response "I don't," when asked whether 
he wanted to make any statements regarding drugs found in his 
apartment. This statement is insufficient, in any light, to 
suggest to the interviewing officer that he should have ceased 
his questioning because defendant was invoking his right to 
counsel. Thus, we do not further address this argument. 
In Michigan v. Moseleyf 423 U.S. 96, 102-03, 96 S. Ct. 321, 
326 (1975), the United State Supreme Court held that its decision 
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in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), did 
not create "a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any 
further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once 
the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent." 
(Footnote omitted.) In Mosely, the defendant was arrested in 
connection with a series of robberies and was advised of his 
Miranda rights before a first interview concerning the robberies 
commenced. See Moseleyf 423 U.S. at 97, 96 S. Ct. at 323. 
Mosely told the officers that he did not wish to answer any 
questions concerning the robberies and the officers immediately 
stopped their questioning. See id. Later that afternoon, Mosely 
was again given his Miranda rights and then interviewed by a 
different officer concerning an unrelated homicide, and confessed 
to participating in the homicide. See id. at 98, 96 S. Ct. at 
324. Mosely later moved to suppress his statements concerning 
the homicide, arguing that the officers were barred from asking 
him any further questions after he had invoked his right to 
remain silent. See id. 
In reversing the Michigan Court of Appeals1 conclusion that 
Moselyfs Miranda rights were violated, the Supreme Court noted 
there was no per se proscription against further questioning, and 
concluded that "the admissibility of statements obtained after 
the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends, under 
Miranda, on whether his 'right to cut off questioning1 was 
'scrupulously honored.'" JJL. at 104, 96 S. Ct. at 326 (footnote 
omitted). The Court looked at a number of factors in concluding 
no Miranda violation occurred: that the questioning abruptly 
ended when Mosely invoked his right to remain silent; that two 
hours passed before a different officer interviewed Mosely about 
a different crime; and that Mosely was given his full Miranda 
rights at the outset of the second interview. See id. at 104-05, 
96 S. Ct. at 327. Thus, the Court concluded that "[t]he 
subsequent questioning did not undercut Mosely1s previous 
decision not to answer [the officer's] inquiries." Id. 
Defendant contends that even under Mosely. his Miranda 
rights were violated. The issue is whether, after his 
invocation, the continued questioning in the first interview and 
the discussion of the same crime in the second interview makes 
Mosely inapplicable because defendant's Miranda rights were not 
"scrupulously honored" in the first interview. This is a 
question we need not answer because we conclude that, even if 
defendant's Miranda rights were violated, this violation was not 
prejudicial. "To establish that this error did not prejudice 
defendant, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
improperly elicited testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson. 507 U.S. 619, 628-29, 113 S. 
Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993)). "In evaluating whether an evidentiary 
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error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we focus on 
'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence 
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'" Id. at 
1296 (citation omitted). "This higher standard does not require 
reversal solely because we might imagine a single juror whose 
decision hinged on [defendant's] confession. Rather, 'we look to 
what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the 
confession on the minds of the average juror.'" State v. 
ViUaKTeal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995) (quoting Harrington v. 
California. 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 1728 (1969)). 
A number of factors determine whether an 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
including "the importance of the witness' 
testimony in the prosecution's case, whether 
the testimony was cumulative, the presence or 
absence of evidence collaborating or 
contradicting the testimony of the witness on 
material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of 
course, the overall strength of the 
prosecution's case." 
Id. at 425-26 (citations omitted). 
We conclude that the testimony from the second interview of 
which defendant complains was primarily cumulative, and harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The officer who interviewed defendant 
testified that: defendant claimed he did not kill the victim; 
defendant was "visibly shaken" when a tree limb from the murder 
scene was produced at the start of the second interview; 
defendant had earlier threatened to kill the victim; defendant 
had twice struck the victim before the murder; and defendant gave 
at least three different versions of events the night of the 
murder. 
However, all the testimony in question came from other state 
witnesses, with the exception of defendant's reaction when shown 
the tree branch at the second interview. We do not believe that 
defendant's "shaken" reaction, alone, is sufficient to constitute 
prejudice. Furthermore, the testimony elicited had little 
importance in the State's case because its case against defendant 
was otherwise strong: Defendant was angry at the victim for 
losing a substantial quantity of methamphetamine precursor and 
had both struck and threatened to kill the victim; defendant and 
codefendant Damon Mumford were the two last people seen with the 
victim; Damon had only met the victim that same day and was 
present as "muscle" to intimidate the victim; defendant returned 
with a bloody knife and the victim's possessions; and finally 
defendant later partially burned the victim's personal effects 
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and directed others to complete the burning. Thus, we conclude 
the trial courtfs denial of defendant's Motion to Suppress does 
not constitute prejudicial error because the State's case, absent 
the testimony in question, was compelling beyond a reasonable 
doubt• 
II. Was Consent to Search Defendant's 
Apartment Voluntary? 
Next, defendant argues that a consent to search his 
apartment was per se involuntary because it was obtained after 
his Miranda rights were violated and thus requires the 
suppression of the post-violation evidence. "[A] trial court's 
ultimate conclusion that a consent was voluntary or involuntary 
is to be reviewed for correctness. The trial court's underlying 
factual findings will not be set aside unless they are found to 
be clearly erroneous." State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 
(Utah 1993) (citation omitted). 
Utah courts have not addressed this issue, but there is 
ample authority from other state and federal jurisdictions 
holding that a consent to search is not an incriminating 
statement for Fifth Amendment purposes. In United States v. 
Rodriguez-Garcia. 983 F.2d 1563 (10th Cir. 1993), the defendant 
was read his Miranda rights and invoked his right to remain 
silent. See id. at 1566. The officers, however, still sought 
and obtained his consent to search two vehicles and a storage 
unit. See id. The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's argument 
that his Miranda rights were violated by the officers seeking his 
consent: 
[A] consent to search is not the type of 
incriminating statement which the Fifth 
Amendment was designed to address. 
Consenting to a search is not "evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature" which 
would require officers to first present a 
Miranda warning. . . . We hold that 
Rodriguez' voluntary consent to the searches 
. . . was unaffected by the invocation of his 
Miranda rights. 
Id. at 1568.2 
2. £££ United States v. Smith. 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir. 
1993), ("We have held that a consent to search is not a self-
incriminating statement, and, therefore, does not amount to 
interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every 
(continued...) 
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We conclude the voluntariness of defendant's consent was 
unaffected by his invocation of Miranda. Thus, we affirm the 
trial court's conclusion that defendant's consent to search his 
apartment was voluntary.3 
III. Rimmasch or Competency Claims on Appeal 
Defendant next complains the trial court erred in allowing a 
State witness to testify that substances seized at his apartment 
were methamphetamine precursor. 
At trial, defendant objected on foundational grounds to a 
detective's testimony that it was the detective's opinion 
precursor to methamphetamine was found in jars in defendant's 
apartment. See Provo City Corp. v. Spotts. 861 P.2d 437, 442-43 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (outlining test for admitting lay testimony 
and circumstantial evidence used to identify narcotics). On 
appeal, he challenges the testimony under Utah Rule of Evidence 
702 and State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) and State v. 
Crosby. 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996). However, even if we were to 
hold that defendant preserved his objection and that the evidence 
2. (...continued) 
court of appeals to address the issue."), cert, denied. Smith v. 
United States, 5io U.S. ioei (1994); Cody v, Solem, 755 F.2d 
1323, 1339 (8th Cir.) (holding Miranda violation does not 
invalidate consent to search as Fifth Amendment only protects 
"testimonial and communicative" evidence), cert, denied. 474 U.S. 
833 (1985); People v. Beaver, 725 P.2d 96, 99 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1986) (same); People v. Alvarado. 644 N.E.2d 783, 786-89 (111. 
App. Ct. 1994) (holding Miranda violation does not vitiate 
voluntary consent)), appeal denied, 649 N.E.2d 419 (111. 1995); 
State v. Juarez. 903 P.2d 241, 246 (N.M. Ct. App.) ("[A] request 
for consent to search is not, by itself an interrogation, just as 
a consent to search is not an incriminating response."), cert, 
denied. 899 P.2d 1138 (N.M. 1995). 
3. Defendant also asserts that his consent to search was invalid 
because it was obtained by the exploitation of a Miranda 
violation. His claim is not well founded. "[T]he exploitation 
analysis . . . is triggered only if the prior illegality is a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment." Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262 
(citing New York v. Harris. 495 U.S. 14, 19, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 
1643-44 (1990)) (additional citations omitted). Although in his 
initial pleading, defendant asserted that the prior illegality 
was the warrantless entry into his apartment, both at trial and 
on appeal he complains only of the alleged Miranda violation as 
the prior illegality. Thus, an exploitation analysis is 
inappropriate and we decline to address it further. 
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should have been excluded, again we simply cannot conclude the 
detectivefs opinion that the jar contained precursor was 
prejudicial. The detective admitted in cross-examination that 
the field tests of the substance in the jar were inconclusive. 
Further, there was ample evidence that the defendant and the 
victim were in a dispute over the victim's loss of precursor 
given to him by defendant. Finally, the prosecutor introduced 
testimony that: Defendant was angry with the victim about the 
missing precursor; defendant owed his suppliers money for the 
precursor; and that defendant both struck the victim and 
threatened his life because of the missing precursor. Thus, "we 
can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have 
reached the same verdict" without hearing the detectivefs 
testimony. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d at 867. 
IV. Motion for Mistrial 
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied his Motion for a Mistrial. "A trial 
court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial and 
its decision will remain undisturbed absent an abuse of that 
discretion. A defendant has the burden of persuading this court 
that the conduct complained of prejudiced the outcome of the 
trial." State v. Price. 909 P.2d 256, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(citations omitted), cert, denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); see 
State v. Workman. 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981) ("[T]he denial of 
motion for a mistrial does not constitute an abuse of discretion 
where no prejudice to the accused is shown."). 
Here, defendant complains that the State violated Rule 16 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to provide him 
with the serology test conducted on a codefendant's t-shirt for 
the victim's blood.4 Assuming for purposes of this argument 
4. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in 
pertinent part: 
(a) [T]he prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material 
or information of which he has knowledge: 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and (5) 
any other item of evidence which the 
court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the 
(continued...) 
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only, that a discovery violation did occur, we conclude that 
defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by not 
having a copy of the serology report. The trial court correctly 
pointed out that either a positive or negative result of the test 
on the codefendantfs t-shirt would have no bearing because the 
evidence had already established that both defendant and the 
codefendant were present at the time of the victim1s death. 
Defendant also argues that he was prejudiced because he was 
unable to review the serology test methodology. We agree with 
the trial court that because the test results are not prejudicial 
to defendant, similarly not knowing the test methodology is 
equally nonprejudicial. We therefore conclude the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's Motion 
for a Mistrial. 
V. Curative Instruction 
Defendant also argues that the trial courtfs failure to 
provide a curative instruction regarding hearsay testimony which 
was admitted without objection is grounds for reversal. 
Specifically, defendant complains the trial court erred when it 
allowed Rebecca Mumford, a codefendant, to testify that her 
husband Damon told her defendant murdered the victim. We 
disagree. Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
states: 
No party may assign as error any portion of 
the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). 
In State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996), this court held 
that "[b]ecause defendant failed to object to the instruction at 
trial, we can reach the issue only to avoid manifest injustice. 
(Citation omitted.) However, the manifest injustice exception 
has no application in cases in which the defendant invited the 
4. (...continued) 
defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a). 
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very error complained of on appeal." Earlier, in State v. 
Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1987), our supreme court held 
that a defendant failed to preserve his objection to jury 
instructions when "he proposed no jury instruction . . . [and] he 
registered no objection to the instructions which the court 
gave." The Hoffman court thus held the objection to the jury 
instructions was not properly preserved and declined to address 
it on appeal. See id, at 504; see also State v. Swan. 928 P.2d 
933, 935 (Mont. 1996) (citation omitted) ("[T]his Court will not 
predicate error upon the failure to give an instruction when the 
party alleging the error failed to offer the instruction."); 
Etcheverry v, State, 821 P.2d 350, 351 (Nev. 1991) (MI[T]he 
failure to object or to request special instruction to the jury 
precludes appellate consideration.1 '[lit was incumbent on him 
to prepare such an instruction and request the court give it.1") 
(citation omitted); James v. State. 817 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1991) ("This Court has repeatedly held that a 
defendant must object to the instruction and must submit written 
requested instructions should he not be satisfied with the 
instructions of the court."). 
Defendant failed either to object to the jury instructions 
or to provide the trial court with a curative instruction on the 
hearsay testimony. The trial court specifically told defendant's 
counsel: "I will invite you to provide me an instruction that we 
can deal with when we finally instruct the jury." However, 
counsel never provided such a curative instruction, and before 
the jury instructions were given to the jury, the trial court 
noted that: 
Court: There was never presented to me any 
requested instruction regarding the issue 
that came up during the course of the trial 
as to the hearsay. And so I assume it's 
waived. 
Counsel: And I had intended with our 
instruction on the informer/benefit to the 
witness testimony to make that--to make an 
argument based on that instruction that I had 
submitted. 
Court: Qkay» And that was never 
presented, All right. 
(Emphasis added.) The facts here are similar to those in 
Blubaugh. in which the defendant also failed to either object to 
the jury instructions or to provide a curative instruction for 
the alleged error. See 904 P.2d at 700. We likewise decline to 
address the question of whether there has been a manifest 
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injustice because the "[defendant] invited the very error 
complained of on appeal.If Id. Thus we conclude defendant waived 
any claimed error in the instructions given.5 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, we uphold defendant's conviction of criminal 
homicide. First, we do not reach the question of whether 
defendant's Miranda rights were violated because we conclude that 
any violation was not prejudicial. Second, we conclude 
defendant's consent to a search of his apartment was voluntary, 
and not per se coercive, despite any Miranda violation. Third, 
the trial court did not commit prejudicial error when it allowed 
a police detective to testify as to his belief that a jar in 
defendant's apartment contained methamphetamine precursor. 
Fourth, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied defendant's Motion for a Mistrial. Next, because 
defendant neither objected to the jury instructions given nor 
provided a curative instruction concerning alleged hearsay 
testimony, we conclude the trial court did not commit reversible 
error when it failed to give a curative instruction. Finally, 
because defendant's several claims of error are without merit or 
have been waived, there is no cumulative error. 
C^udith M. Billings, Judg^ 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
5. Finally, defendant argues we should reverse his conviction 
under the cumulative error doctrine. Because we conclude 
defendant's several claims of error on appeal have been waived or 
are without merit, our confidence in the trial court's verdict is 
not undermined. See State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 277 (Utah 
1998) (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993)). 
We thus conclude there is no cumulative error. 
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